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1. Introduction
When providing professional services, an expert often has superior information about the ap-
propriate “treatment” for a consumer’s problem. An extensive literature has studied how to
prevent the expert from prescribing the “wrong” treatment for financial gains, with one major
insight being that the expert’s incentive to “cheat” can be removed if the price margins for
alternative treatments are equalized (e.g., Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In practice, the
expert may also need to exert costly effort to diagnose the consumer’s problem. The issue is
then more complex and less understood, especially because the equal price margin condition
could eliminate the expert’s incentive to exert diagnosis effort. In this paper, we investigate the
role of liability in disciplining the expert’s behavior in a model with both adverse selection and
moral hazard. We demonstrate that a well-designed liability can lead to efficiency in both the
treatment recommendation and the diagnosis effort by the expert. We further show when the
market may fail to be efficient even under the optimal liability, and what can be done to restore
efficiency.
We consider a model in which a consumer needs a treatment for a problem (e.g., a medical
condition) from an expert (e.g., a physician). The problem is either minor or major, and there
are two alternative treatments that are competitively provided in the market. Upon seeing the
consumer, an expert may immediately learn which treatment is appropriate from his expertise,
or can exert (additional) private effort to obtain this information. The expert may then either
provide a treatment or decline to serve the consumer without receiving any payment. He may
prescribe the wrong treatment—a major treatment for a minor problem (overtreatment) or a
minor treatment for a major problem (undertreatment)—if doing so increases his payoff. The
type of treatment provided by the expert is observed publicly but the outcome of treatment is
verifiable only with some probability.
Our setup departs from the existing literature on expert markets in two significant ways.
First, we consider a general service product that differs from a pure credence or a pure experience
good, with each as a limiting case, and we study broadly the optimal design of liability in
expert markets. The literature has often considered goods/services in expert markets as a
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credence goods (e.g., Darby and Karni, 1973; Taylor, 1995; Emons, 1997, 2001; Fong, 2005; Alger
and Salanie, 2006; Liu, 2011), which makes the key assumption that consumers do not learn
the treatment outcome afterwards—particularly in the case of overtreatment—and naturally
precludes the use of liability to motivate experts. However, there is abundant evidence that
service outcomes in expert markets, including healthcare, financial services, car repair services,
auditing, taxi rides, can sometimes be verified, either through the use of modern technology
(e.g., video recording the treatment process and comparative big data analysis) or with the
help of third-party experts. Moreover, professional liabilities targeted at curbing negligent and
fraudulent behavior in expert markets are an inherent part of tort law in many countries. Second,
unlike the focus in the literature on adverse selection, we also consider moral hazard in the
model.1 We believe a model of both adverse selection and moral hazard captures more realistic
features of many expert markets.2 For example, a patient with a bad cough and a fever may need
only a minor treatment (home rest, possibly with some medication) or a major treatment that
requires hospitalization, and the physician may need the incentive to exert diagnosis effort to
determine which treatment is appropriate, in addition to the incentive for truthful information
reporting.3
We find that for a wide range of liabilities the expert will recommend the appropriate treat-
ment based on his private information if price margins for alternative treatments are sufficiently
close, which will be true in equilibrium. Remarkably, here the “equal price margin” condition
is no longer necessary to solve the adverse selection problem, because the presence of liability
relaxes the incentive constraint for the expert to reveal his private information truthfully. In
fact, the familiar result that price margins are equalized for the two treatments emerges in
1Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) also investigates the incentives of experts to exert diagnostic effort and to
report truthfully when the experts face competition from discounters who cannot perform diagnosis. Another
notable exception is Bester and Dahm (2018), which analyzes the design of optimal contract when payment can be
made contingent upon the consumer’s report of her subjective evaluation of the treatment outcome in a combined
model of adverse selection and moral hazard.
2Bardey, et al (2020) analyzes a market for experience goods that also combine both adverse selection and
moral hazard. They study optimal regulation and to what extent competition can substitute for regulation to
curb the distortions from these two problems. Different from them, our paper studies liability design in markets
that also share features of a credence good.
3The expert service could also be to repair a consumer’s car, to fix a client’s malfunctioning air-conditioning
system, to provide advice on a client’s legal problem, or to improve the security of a client’s computer network.
In all these situations, the expert may need to be provided with incentives both to incur (private) diagnosis cost
and to report the consumer’s problem honestly.
2
equilibrium as a special case of our model under zero liability.
While there are many liability rules under which the expert will recommend the appropriate
treatment given his private information, they generally do not provide the efficient incentive
for the expert’s diagnosis effort. We derive the necessary and sufficient condition for a liability
rule to result in both honest recommendation and efficient diagnosis. The efficient liability rule,
when it exists, specifies damage payments for verified losses from wrong treatments that will
induce equilibrium prices under which (i) the price margin for each treatment is equal to its
expected liability cost and (ii) the expected price margin for the two treatments is equal to the
efficient critical value of the expert’s diagnosis cost. Then, the expert will conduct the additional
diagnosis if and only if its cost does not exceed its expected social benefit; and he will also choose
the efficient treatment—the treatment that maximizes the expected total surplus—based on his
information.
We demonstrate that the efficient liability exists when, for instance, the expected loss to the
consumer from no treatment is sufficiently high. However, it may fail to exist. Inefficiency can
arise in our model for three possible reasons: the expert prescribes the wrong treatment given his
information, he chooses diagnosis effort inefficiently, or he declines to serve the consumer after
seeing her.4 When the consumer may be (partially) compensated through liability for her loss
from a “wrong” treatment, the social cost of such a loss is not fully born by the consumer. To
reduce the expert’s information rent when he learns the consumer’s problem without additional
diagnosis, the prices may become too low to incentivize the expert to exert the efficient diagnosis
effort or to be willing to serve the consumer when the diagnosis cost is too high. Consequently,
unfettered competition between experts can undermine the efficient role of liability, causing
socially deficient diagnosis effort and treatment. Our analysis will also characterize the second-
best liability rule in such situations, where the expert will choose the appropriate treatment
given his information (or prior belief), but his diagnosis effort is below the efficient level.
We further show that, when the first-best outcome can not be attained under unfettered
competition, an efficient liability always exists if either (i) price margins are constrained to be
4We assume that welfare is always higher for the consumer to receive some treatment than not to have any
treatment.
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above certain minimum levels, or (ii) the expert is obligated to serve after seeing the consumer.
Each of these two (regulatory) constraints, when feasible, ensures that under optimal liability
the expert will both exert efficient diagnosis effort and provide the proper treatment based on his
information, thereby restoring full efficiency. Intuitively, the (proper) minimum-price constraint
directly provides the incentive for implementing efficient diagnosis effort. On the other hand,
the obligation to serve removes the option for the expert not to treat the consumer after seeing
her, so that the expert will efficiently choose between incurring additional diagnosis cost or
treating the consumer based only on his prior belief. In each of these two cases, the liability
rule is judiciously designed to satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency and,
in the case with obligation to serve, to also ensure the expert’s willingness to participate in the
market.
The economic analysis of liability goes back to the seminal contributions by Brown (1973)
and Shavell (1980). In markets where consumers can detect and verify a product’s failure,
the literature has studied how product liability rules affect a producer’s incentives to improve
product safety ex ante and to provide ex post remedy for an unsafe product (e.g., Daughety and
Reinganum, 1995, 2008; Spier, 2011; Hua, 2011; Chen and Hua, 2012). Shavel (2007) presents
a survey on the analysis of liabilities for accidents. In credence goods markets where consumers
are assumed to rely on experts to determine which treatment is appropriate, there has been
little attention to the role of liability in motivating the experts’ effort and honesty, presumably
because of the view that if consumers cannot tell whether or not a treatment is appropriate,
liability would not be effective as an incentive mechanism. In an alternative credence goods
setting, consumers are assumed to be able to verify undertreatment, and the institution of
liability, defined as “the necessity for a seller to provide a good of sufficient quality to meet
the consumer’s needs” (Balafoutas and Kerschbamer, 2020), prevents experts from providing
insufficient services.5 By taking the broader view of legal liability in the tradition of Brown
(1973) and Shavell (1980) and recognizing that products in expert markets often share properties
of both credence and experience goods, we analyze the judicious design of expert liability in a
5See also Fong, Liu, and Wright (2014) that emphasizes the importance of verifiability relative to liability in a
model of adverse selection, and Fong and Liu (2018) that considers how liability may affect the expert’s incentive
to maintain reputation.
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model of probabilistic verification for the treatment outcome, in accordance with the observed
feature in many expert markets.
While our model applies to markets with expert services in general, its most prominent
application is probably the health care market where physicians’ incentives are regulated by
medical malpractice liabilities (e.g., Danzon, 1991).6 Studies suggest that 4 to 18 percent of
patients seeking care in hospitals in the U.S. are victims of medical malpractice, which could
cost between $17-29 billion per year (Arlen, 2013). Liability for medical malpractice has emerged
to discipline physicians and protect patients, but its performance has been controversial, and
studies on its optimal design are scarce.7 Our analysis sheds light on this issue. In particular, our
results suggest that malpractice liability is essential for motivating physicians to exert proper
diagnosis efforts. The efficient liability level depends not only on the magnitude of the loss,
but also on whether there is overtreatment or undertreatment, because their probabilities of
detection often differ. Also, the efficient liability is sometimes punitive, (much) exceeding the
patient’s loss from a malpractice incident. Furthermore, unfettered price competition for services
among potential experts could undermine efficiency, causing the failure of the existence of an
efficient liability rule.
We present our model in Section 2. Section 3 describes the efficient benchmark, characterizes
market equilibrium under a given liability rule, and analyzes the optimal design of liability.
Sections 4 and 5 establish our results under a minimum-price constraint and under the obligation-
to-serve requirement, respectively. Section 6 concludes. Lengthier proofs are relegated to an
appendix.
6Many studies have found that physicians respond to financial incentives in treatment choices, including
Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin (1999) on cesarean deliveries, Dickstein (2016) on the choice of drugs that treat
depression, and Coey (2015) on treatment choices in heart attack management.
7As important exceptions, Simon (1982) compares negligence rule with strict liability in the health care market;
Arlen and MacLeod (2005) analyzes optimal liability when the physician invests in expertise and there may be
inadequate treatment. The key conflict in both papers is a moral hazard problem. Demougin and Fluet (2006,
2008) analyze the optimal assignment of liabilities under different rules of proof in lawsuits, which is applicable
to the healthcare markets, but their focus is very different from ours.
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2. The Model
A consumer needs a treatment from an expert for a problem that can be either minor or major,
t ∈ {m,M} , where Pr (t = m) = θ = 1 − Pr (t = M) and θ ∈ (0, 1). The expert can provide
either a minor treatment Tm or a major treatment TM , which is appropriate respectively if t is
m or M . The consumer’s gross utility from the treatment is
v (t, T ) =















0 if T = Tt for t = m,M
−zu if t = M and T = Tm
−zo if t = m and T = TM
. (1)
Thus, the consumer’s gross utility is normalized to zero if she receives the appropriate treatment
for her problem. If her type is M but the treatment is Tm, undertreatment occurs and the
consumer suffers a loss zu > 0. On the other hand, overtreatment occurs when problem type
m is treated with TM , in which case the harm to the consumer is zo > 0.
8 We further assume
that the consumer is able to verify her loss zu or zo with probability αu ∈ (0, 1] or αo ∈ (0, 1],
when undertreatment or overtreatment has occurred, respectively. This formulation allows us
to analyze a full spectrum of possibilities concerning the verifiability of the treatment outcome,
encompassing pure credence and experience goods as the limit cases. In particular, the case of
αo → 0 and αu → 0 corresponds to pure credence goods for which a consumer is unable to know
the outcome after the treatment, the case of αo → 0 and αu = 1 corresponds to full verifiability on
undertreatment but no verifiability on overtreatment, and the case of αo = αu = 1 corresponds
to an experience good for which the consumer perfectly learns the treatment outcome. Most
goods and services in expert markets probably fall between pure credence and experience goods
with intermediate values of αo and αu.
9
Note that the way we define consumer’s utility also differs from that in the credence goods
8Our analysis and results would be essentially the same if we interpret zu and zo as the expected losses
associated with undertreatment and overtreatment.
9The loss might be verified not directly by the consumer, but by third party experts or the legal discovery
process. In health care markets, overtreatment cases may center on the medical necessity of a procedure. For
example, Dignity Health pays $37 million in False Claims Action, entering a settlement for improper and medically
unnecessary hospital admissions (Modern Healthcare, Oct. 30, 2014).
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literature, where the harm from overtreatment is usually normalized to zero, and undertreatment
leads to the same utility as no treatment. (See, e.g. Emons, 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2006). We depart from this modeling by assuming that overtreatment also leads to a harm for
the consumer (but allowing zo = 0 as a special case) and undertreatment may lead to a loss
different from no treatment (but with the two being equal as a special case). By adopting this
more realistic setup, we wish to explicitly account for the increasing concern over the harm from
overtreatment in practice (e.g., Brownlee, 2008; Buck, 2013, 2015).10
If the problem is not treated by the expert, the consumer suffers an expected loss in the
(absolute) amount of x. Treatments Tm and TM cost the expert 0 and C > 0, respectively, and
we assume
(i) C + θzo < x, and (ii) C < zu(1− θ), (2)
so that (i) applying a major treatment without knowing whether t = m or M is more efficient
than leaving the problem untreated, and (ii) without knowing whether t = m or M , there exist
parameter values under which TM is more efficient than Tm. The type of treatment provided
to the consumer—e.g., whether a certain procedure is carried out—is assumed to be publicly
observed. Thus, if the expert recommends treatment TM , cost C must be incurred to implement
the treatment.
The expert is better informed about the nature of the consumer’s problem and, if necessary,
can exert extra effort to diagnose the problem. Specifically, we assume that upon seeing the
consumer, with probability β ∈ [0, 1) the expert is informed about the realization of t (i.e.,
whether t = m or M), while with probability 1− β he is not informed of t but privately learns
the realization of k, his private cost of diagnosis effort to learn the realization of t.11 Ex ante,
k follows a continuous probability distribution F (k) on support
[
0, k̄
]
. We denote the expert’s
decision on whether to incur k—if he does not observe the realization of t upon seeing the
10Buck (2015) reported that John Dempsey Hospital was discovered in 2011 to administer chest combination
CT scans at nearly 10 times the national average while health experts noted that combination scans do not provide
more valuable information in comparison to a single CT scan in most of those situations. Excess combination
scans expose patients to large doses of radiation which increases the risk of developing cancer at later stage.
11This effort is beyond the observable normal effort associated with seeing the consumer. The extra cost k may
include the additional time the expert spends with the consumer, the effort to gather additional information or
to learn new developments in treatment technology.
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consumer—by e ∈ {E,N} . If he chooses E by incurring k, the expert learns the realization of
t, while if e = N (i.e., incurring no k) the expert maintains his prior belief about t. Whether
the expert incurs the diagnosis cost is his private information.
The expert may be liable for a bad outcome that is a result of maltreatment. The liability
rule specifies damage payments D ≡ (Do,Du), so that the expert is required to pay Du > 0 if
it is verified that the consumer has received undertreatment with loss zu, and he is required to
pay Do > 0 if it is verified that the consumer has received overtreatment with loss zo.
The timing of the game, given a liability rule D, proceeds as follows:
1. The consumer sets prices (PM , Pm) for treatments TM and Tm, respectively, to maximize
her expected surplus.12 The consumer then visits the expert with her problem.
2. Upon seeing the consumer, the expert either learns the realization of t or, without learning
t, the realization of his private cost of diagnosis effort k. In the latter case, he can privately
choose either to incur k (denoted as E) or not to do so (denoted as N). He then chooses
T ∈ {Tm, TM , R} , where R denotes his action of refusing to treat the consumer, for which
he and the consumer will receive payoffs zero and −x, respectively.13 The game ends if
the expert chooses T = R, and it proceeds to the next stage otherwise.
3. The treatment recommended by the expert is implemented and payment (PM or Pm) is
made.
4. If a loss from treatment is verified, the expert compensates the consumer according to the
liability rule D.
Notice that there are potentially four dimensions of asymmetric information in our model:
the expert’s private information about (i) whether he learns the realization of t upon seeing the
consumer, (ii) the realization of k, (iii) whether he incurs the diagnosis cost, and (iv) whether
t = m or M , with or without incurring k.
12We interpret this as resulting from unrestricted competition among potential experts. Relatedly, Arlen and
MacLeod (2005) analyzes a setting in which the patients are price setters while the physician market is fully
competitive.
13Notice that, as the expected value for the consumer’s outside option, −x could reflect the possibility that the
consumer may visit other experts, for which there could be costs associated with delay or other frictions.
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3. Analysis
In this section, we first describe the efficient benchmark. We then characterize the equilibrium
of the game between the expert and the consumer, for a given liability rule. Finally, we analyze
the design of an optimal liability rule that maximizes welfare (as measured by expected total
surplus), and provide conditions under which full efficiency may or may not be attained.
3.1 Efficient Benchmark
Suppose all information is public and the expert can be required to act efficiently in all possible
situations. If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is clearly efficient for him to
choose Tt for t ∈ {m,M}. So we focus on the case where the expert needs to incur k in order to
learn t. The expert can then choose (N,TM ): implementing TM without incurring diagnosis cost
k; or (N,Tm): implementing Tm without incurring cost k; or ET : choosing E followed by Tt for
t ∈ {m,M}. The total surplus of the expert and the consumer for each of these strategies is
W (N,TM ) = −θzo − C; W (N,Tm) = −(1− θ)zu W (ET ) = −k − (1− θ)C. (3)
By the assumption on C from part (i) of (2),
W (N,TM ) = −θzo − C > −x,
and thus if the expert has no additional information about t beyond his prior belief, a major
treatment has higher welfare than no treatment. Therefore it is never efficient for the expert to
choose R. Moreover, W (N,TM ) ≥ W (N,Tm) if and only if
zo ≤
zu(1− θ)− C
θ
≡ z∗o or zu ≥
θzo + C
1− θ
≡ z∗u. (4)
That is, if the expert must choose the treatment based on his prior belief about t, it is efficient
to choose TM if the harm from overtreatment is relatively small compared to undertreatment
(zo ≤ z
∗
o), and to choose Tm otherwise. Notice that z
∗
o , which is positive by the assumption on
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C from part (ii) of (2), is increasing in zu and decreasing in C.
Incurring the diagnosis cost is efficient when W (ET ) ≥ max {W (N,TM ), W (N,Tm)}, which
holds if and only if
k ≤ min {θ (C + zo) , (1− θ) (zu − C)} ≡ k
∗, (5)
and we assume k∗ < k̄ throughout the paper to focus on the more interesting case that it is not
always efficient to incur k.
Lemma 1 summarizes the efficient benchmark.
Lemma 1 If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is efficient for him to choose Tt
for t ∈ {m,M}. Otherwise, it is efficient to choose (i) (N,TM ) if k > k
∗ and zo ≤ z
∗
o ; (ii)
(N,Tm) if k > k
∗ and zo > z
∗
o ; (iii) ET if k ≤ k
∗.
Thus, when additional diagnosis effort is required to learn t, the efficient decision by the
expert depends straightforwardly on the realized value of k and on the value of zo relative to
z∗o : When the diagnosis cost is sufficiently high, it is efficient to have TM without incurring k if
the loss from overtreatment is small enough, while it is efficient to have Tm without incurring
k if the loss from overtreatment is high enough; when the diagnosis cost is sufficiently low, it is
efficient to incur k and then choose the appropriate treatment.
3.2 Equilibrium of the Expert-Consumer Game
We now analyze the game between the expert and the consumer, taking the liability rule (D)
as given. Without loss of generality, denote any pair of prices by PM = C +ΦM and Pm = Φm,
where ΦM ≥ 0 and Φm ≥ 0 are the price margins or markups for the expert if he provides
treatments TM and Tm, respectively. Each pair of prices—or equivalently (ΦM ,Φm)—posted by
the consumer is followed by a choice of the expert.
Since Φt ≥ 0 for t ∈ {m,M}, the expert never refuses to treat the consumer (T = R) if he
knows the realization of t. Furthermore, if the expert knows the realization of t, either upon
seeing the consumer or after incurring k, it would be optimal for him to choose Tt for t ∈ {m,M}
if and only if
ΦM ≥ Φm − αuDu, Φm ≥ ΦM − αoDo. (6)
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Our analysis will proceed under the presumption that (6) holds—so that the expert will choose
the appropriate treatment if he knows what t is—and we later confirm that this is indeed the
case in equilibrium and a pair of prices that satisfy (6) is indeed optimal for the consumer.14
Notice that for (6) to hold, ΦM = Φm if Du = Do = 0. That is, in order for the expert to
recommend the appropriate treatment given his information, equal price margins from different
treatments are required when no liability can be imposed on the expert (e.g., Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer, 2006). When there are liabilities—as we allow in this paper—ΦM = Φm is sufficient
but no longer necessary for (6): as long as the price margins for the two treatments are not too
different, the expert will have the right incentive to recommend the appropriate treatment if he
knows t.15 Thus, the presence of malpractice liability relaxes the constraint on price margins to
encourage the right treatment from the expert.
Given (6), the expert will choose Tt for t ∈ {m,M} if he learns the realization of t. Hence,
we can focus our analysis on the expert’s choice between R and the following three options if
he does not initially learn t: (i) (N,TM ); (ii) (N,Tm) ; and (iii) ET . For a given D and k,
the expert’s profit from R is always zero. His profits from each of the other three choices are,
respectively:
π(N,TM ) = ΦM − θαoDo, π(N,Tm) = Φm − (1− θ)αuDu, (7)
π(ET ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM − k, (8)
where θαoDo is the expert’s expected liability payment to the consumer under (N,TM ), since
overtreatment occurs with probability θ; and, similarly, (1 − θ)αuDu is the expert’s expected
liability payment to the consumer under (N,Tm). The expert will make his choice to maximize
his expected payoff; when he has the same expected payoff from any two options, we assume
that he will choose the option that is favorable to the consumer.
14For the design of an optimal liability, it is without loss of generality to devote our attention to situations
where (6) is satisfied. If (6) is violated, the expert will have the perverse incentive to choose the “wrong”treatment
even when he knows t, which cannot maximize welfare.
15This observation is related to the idea in Bardey, et al (2020) that to incentivize a seller to collect information
and provide truthful advice on a consumer’s choice between two goods, the profits from both goods must lie within
an implementability cone. However, in our environment, price margins close to each other do not guarantee the
exertion of diagnosis efforts, and liability is crucial for such efforts.
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Thus, following a pair of prices Φ ≡ (ΦM ,Φm), the expert’s optimal choice when he does not
initially learn t is ET if and only if
π(ET ) ≥ max{0, π(N,TM ), π(N,Tm)}, (9)
or, equivalently, if k ≤ k̂(D,Φ), where
k̂(D,Φ) ≡ min{θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM , θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM −Φm + αuDu)}. (10)
If ΦM ≥ θαoDo and Φm ≥ (1 − θ)αuDu, we have π(N,TM ) ≥ 0 and π(N,Tm) ≥ 0, and the
expert will not choose R. However, if ΦM < θαoDo or Φm < (1− θ)αuDu, the expert may earn
negative expected profit when choosing TM or Tm based on prior belief about t, in which case
he may choose R if k is high. Note that as Do and Du increase, k̂(D,Φ) is higher. This suggests
that it is desirable for the consumer to implement ET with a positive probability—when the
expert does not initially learn t— only if the total expected liability payments are not too high.
This consideration is reflected in the condition below:
αuDu + αoDo ≤ min
{
C + zo
1− θ
,
zu − C
θ
}
. (11)
In what follows, we proceed assuming condition (11) holds, and will later confirm that the
condition indeed holds under any welfare-maximizing liability. The lemma below establishes
some useful properties concerning the expert’s and the consumer’s optimal choices.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium:
(i) if ΦM < θαoDo and Φm < (1− θ)αuDu, then k̂(D,Φ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM ;
(ii) if ΦM ≥ θαoDo or Φm ≥ (1− θ)αuDu, then ΦM = θαoDo and Φm = (1− θ)αuDu, with
k̂(D,Φ) = θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu).
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that θαoDo and (1− θ)αuDu are the expected liability cost when the expert chooses
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(N,TM ) and (N,Tm), respectively. In equilibrium, the prices are either just high enough so that
the expert will always treat the consumer even when he does not know t (case (ii) in Lemma 2),
or they are low enough so that the expert will not treat the consumer unless he knows t (case
(i) in Lemma 2).
An implication of Lemma 2 is that liability is essential for the expert to exert diagnosis effort.
If Do = Du = 0, then case (ii) applies and at the optimal prices ΦM = Φm, with k̂(D,Φ) = 0 so
that the expert never invests in diagnosis effort for any k > 0.
Let the (expected) price margin for the two treatments be
Φ̄ ≡ θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM .
Then, from Lemma 2, in equilibrium we only need to consider
Φ̄





= θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu) for ΦM = θαoDo and Φm = (1− θ)αuDu
< θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu) for ΦM < θαoDo and Φm < (1− θ)αuDu
. (12)
Lemma 3 below characterizes the equilibrium prices.
Lemma 3 For given liability D ≡ (Do,Du), there exists a market equilibrium with Φ̄ = Φ̄
∗, and
either (i) Φ̄∗ = θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu) with Φ
∗
M = θαoDo and Φ
∗
m = (1− θ)αuDu, or
(ii) Φ̄∗ < θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu) with Φ
∗
M < θαoDo and Φ
∗
m < (1− θ)αuDu.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.3 Optimal Liability
We can now establish a necessary and sufficient condition for any efficient liability: a liability
rule that, together with the equilibrium prices it induces, results in full efficiency in the expert’s
diagnosis and treatment of the consumer’s problem.
Proposition 1 Full efficiency can be achieved if and only if there exists liability D∗ ≡ (D∗o ,D
∗
u)
13
under which the equilibrium price satisfies
Φ̄∗ = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u) = k
∗, (13)
where Φ̄∗ and k∗ are respectively defined in Lemma 3 and Equation (5).
Proof. Suppose there is a pair (D∗o ,D
∗
u) under which Φ̄
∗ = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗
o +αuD
∗
u) = k
∗. Then,
case (ii) of Lemma 2 applies and we have Φ∗M = θαoD
∗
o and Φ
∗
m = (1− θ)αuD
∗
u. The expert will
choose Tt if he learns t upon seeing the consumer. Moreover, when he does not initially observe
t, the expert will choose ET if and only if
k ≤ k̂(D∗, Φ̄∗) = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u) = k
∗.
Thus, under liability (D∗o ,D
∗
u) full efficiency will be achieved.
On the other hand, suppose efficiency is attained in equilibrium under some liability (D∗o ,D
∗
u).
We show that the equilibrium price must then satisfy (13). Suppose, to the contrary, that Φ̄∗ <
θ(1−θ)(αoD
∗
o+αuD
∗
u) = k
∗. Then ΦM < θαoD
∗
o and Φm < (1−θ)αuD
∗
u. It follows from Lemma
2 (i) that k̂(D, Φ̄∗) = Φ̄∗ so that R will be chosen when k ∈ (k̂, k∗], which occurs with a positive
probability in equilibrium and is not efficient. Moreover, if Φ̄∗ = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u) 6= k
∗,
then k̂(D∗, Φ̄∗) 6= k∗, and the diagnosis choice is not efficient.
When full efficiency can be achieved, under the equilibrium prices in Proposition 1, Φ∗M =
θαoD
∗
o and Φ
∗
m = (1− θ)αuD
∗
u, Condition (6) is indeed satisfied. In equilibrium, the expert has
the same (zero) expected profit in treatments TM and Tm if his information is only the prior
belief about t. Unlike the result in the literature, in our model the two treatments need not have
equal price margins to induce the expert to choose the appropriate treatment when he knows the
realization of t. Rather, the two treatments need to have the same expected profit—given the
expected liability cost—under the expert’s prior belief about t. The efficient liability D∗ equates
the expected liability cost under prior belief to the efficient k∗, and incentivizes the expert to
fully internalize the social benefit from choosing the efficient diagnosis effort.
Also, if liability Du or Do is high enough so that (11) is violated, it might be to the advantage
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of the consumer that the expert does not learn the realization of t and provides the wrong
treatment, in which case the consumer could collect the (excessively) high damage payment.
Thus, if the liability is not properly designed, the equilibrium incentive could be perverse. This
situation will not arise if the liability satisfies (11), which also induces price margins for the two
treatments to be close enough to satisfy (6).
Proposition 1 implies that to achieve full efficiency, there must exist liability rule (D∗o ,D
∗
u)
that satisfies θ(1 − θ)(αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u) = k
∗, and at the same time it induces Φ̄(D∗) = θ(1 −
θ)(αoD
∗
o+αuD
∗
u) with Φ
∗
M = θαoD
∗
o and Φ
∗
m = (1−θ)αuD
∗
u in equilibrium. Furthermore, full ef-
ficiency fails if for all liability (Do,Du) satisfying θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu) = k
∗, the induced equilib-
rium price margins are Φ∗M < θαoDo and Φ
∗
m < (1−θ)αuDu with Φ̄(D) < θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu).
This can happen if the consumer finds it optimal to set low prices to reduce the expert’s infor-
mation rent in the event that the expert knows the consumer’s type without exerting diagnosis
effort.
Using these observations, Proposition 2 below provides explicit conditions under which full
efficiency may or may not be attained. In particular, in part (i), the loss from no treatment, x,
is sufficiently large to ensure that (13) holds under some D∗; in part (ii), when β is sufficiently
large, for all (Do,Du) satisfying θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu) = k
∗, the induced equilibrium price
is Φ̄(D) < θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu). In stating the proposition, we assume zo < z
∗
o , so that
k∗ = θ (C + zo) and W (N,TM ) > W (N,Tm). The analysis for the case zo > z
∗
o is analogous and
is briefly discussed after Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose zo < z
∗
o . Given other parameter values, there exist x̂ > 0 and β̂ < 1 such
that: (i) if x > x̂, then D∗o =
C+zo
(1−θ)αo
and D∗u = 0 induce the efficient outcome in equilibrium,
with Φ∗M =
θ(C+zo)
1−θ and Φ
∗
m = 0; (ii) if β > β̂, there exists no (Do,Du) under which the
equilibrium is efficient.
Proof. See the appendix.
In part (i) of Proposition 2, when x is sufficiently large, the consumer is always better off
with treatment TM than without treatment, even if the expert does not learn t. Hence the
consumer optimally offers ΦM = θαoDo so that the expert will choose (N,TM ) in case he does
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not learn t initially and k turns out to be too high, and she optimally offers Φm = 0 to minimize
the expert’s rent when he learns t initially or after incurring k. If D∗o =
C+zo
(1−θ)αo
and D∗u = 0,
then
k̂ = θΦ∗m + (1− θ)Φ
∗
M = (1− θ)
θ (C + zo)
1− θ
= θ (C + zo) = k
∗,
so that the expert will incur diagnosis effort efficiently, and he will also report information
truthfully since (6) is satisfied.
To see the intuition for part (ii) of Proposition 2, notice that when the consumer can be
(partially) compensated for the loss associated with an inappropriate treatment by liability,
she does not bear the full social cost of the loss. Indeed, in choosing the optimal prices, the
consumer faces the tradeoff of extracting more surplus by reducing the prices when the expert
knows t, and incentivizing the expert to exert diagnosis effort when the expert does not know
t. Hence, in order to reduce the expert’s information rent, the consumer may want to lower the
prices below the level that would induce the efficient effort, and she will indeed do so when β
is high so that the expert will choose the appropriate treatment sufficiently often even without
incurring k. As a result, when β is sufficiently high, an efficient liability—one that will ensure
k̂ = k∗—fails to exist. Proposition 2 highlights the subtlety in the design of an efficient liability:
while liability is necessary to provide incentives for the expert to exert effort, it also creates a
divergence between the social and private costs of a loss to the consumer. Consequently, while
unconstrained competition in the expert market maximizes consumer surplus, inefficiency may
arise even under an optimally designed liability rule.
When zo ≥ z
∗
o , a similar analysis can establish that there exist some x̃ > 0 and β̃ < 1 such
that if x > x̃, then D∗o = 0 and D
∗
u =
zu−C
θαu
induce the efficient outcome, with Φ∗M = 0 and
Φ∗m =
(1−θ)(zu−C)
θ
; whereas if β > β̃, no (Do,Du) can lead to full efficiency.
A liability rule that would induce the efficient outcome in equilibrium is clearly optimal from
the social welfare point of view. When full efficiency cannot be achieved, there is a second-best
liability rule that maximizes the expected total surplus in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 When the first-best liability fails to exist, there is a second-best liability D∗∗ =
(D∗∗o ,D
∗∗
u ) that maximizes expected total surplus. The equilibrium expected price margin is
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Φ̄ (D∗∗) = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗∗
o + αuD
∗∗
u ), and the expert’s diagnosis effort is below the efficient level:
k̂(D∗∗, Φ̄ (D∗∗)) = Φ̄ (D∗∗) < k∗.
Proof. See the appendix.
Therefore, when an optimally-designed liability rule is unable to achieve fully efficiency, it
can implement the second best outcome by inducing equilibrium prices under which the expert
expects the same (zero) profit from both treatments and will thus choose them efficiently when
he does not learn t, but in general his choice of diagnosis effort is not efficient. In particular, in
the case of pure credence goods with αo → 0 and αu → 0, given liabilities satisfying (11), there
exists no equilibrium prices such that condition (13) holds, and therefore, full efficiency cannot
be achieved and the expert underinvests in diagnosis effort under the second-best liability rule.
In the next two sections, we explore potential remedies that may help to restore incentives in
such environment through regulating the prices (Section 4) or by imposing the obligation for
the expert to serve (Section 5).
4. Minimum Price Constraint
As we demonstrated in Section 3, competitive equilibrium in the expert market need not be
efficient, even when liability is optimally chosen. In this section, we show that efficiency can be
restored with an optimally-designed liability if there is minimum-price regulation that, for given
D = (Do,Du) , requires
16
ΦM ≥ θαoDo, Φm ≥ (1− θ)αuDu. (14)
When (14) is satisfied, ΦM and Φm are high enough so that the expert, whose outside option is
zero profit, will always receive non-negative expected profit from providing each treatment, i.e.
16This minimum-price constraint may also arise without regulation if the expert and the consumer share bar-
gaining power in setting prices because, for example, the consumer has cost to compare prices from potential
service providers. The expert may then be able to insist on prices that would ensure non-negative profit for each
treatment as in (14).
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π(N,TM ) ≥ 0 and π(N,Tm) ≥ 0. In equilibrium, from Lemma 2, Constraint (14) implies
Φ∗M = θαoDo, Φ
∗
m = (1− θ)αuDu. (15)
The result below establishes that there exists an optimal liability rule that induces the efficient
outcome in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (14) holds. Then, the following liability rule results in the efficient
outcome in equilibrium:
D∗u =
k∗
(1− θ)αu
, D∗o =
k∗
θαo
. (16)
Proof. When (14) holds, making use of the equilibrium price in (15) we have
Φ̄∗ = θΦ∗m + (1− θ) Φ
∗
M = θ (1− θ) (αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u)
= θ (1− θ)
[
αo
k∗
θαo
+ αu
k∗
(1− θ)αu
]
= k∗.
Then, from Proposition 1, full efficiency is achieved under D∗.
Notice that with the liability rule that implements the efficient outcome, the equilibrium price
margin from each treatment is equal to the efficient critical value of k, k∗. Thus, while there
exist a range of liabilities that would induce the equilibrium markups given in (15) for the two
treatments and these markups generally differ, they are the same under the efficient liability,
being equal to the expert’s expected liability cost for each treatment without knowing t. By
selecting D∗ that equates this liability cost to the efficient k∗, the efficient liability incentivizes
the expert to fully internalize the social benefit from choosing the efficient diagnosis effort. In
Section 3, where the price offered by the consumer is not constrained, the consumer may not
fully internalize this benefit due to liability protection and may thus set a too low price for the
expert, inefficiently reducing his diagnosis effort. The minimum-price constraint removes this
possibility and helps to restore efficiency.
The efficient liability in (16) can be expressed as a multiplier of the loss from undertreatment
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or overtreatment: D∗u = γuzu and D
∗
o = γozo, where
γu =
k∗
(1− θ)αuzu
, γo =
k∗
θαozo
.
It’s possible that γu > 1 or γo > 1; that is, there can be punitive damages. Moreover, under the
efficient liability, as the loss from overtreatment becomes more likely to be verifiable relative to
the loss from undertreatment, the penalty for undertreatment will increase (in the sense that γu
becomes higher relative to γo). Notice that since in general γu 6= γo, if the liability multipliers are
constrained to be the same—say, γ—for both types of losses, the market outcome will generally
be inefficient.
5. Obligation to Serve
We now show that, instead of price regulation, full efficiency can also be restored with a properly-
chosen liability rule if there is regulation on the expert’s obligation to serve. Specifically, suppose
that upon seeing the consumer, the expert is not allowed to choose R. If the expert agrees to
see the consumer, he will incur k if and only if
π(ET ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM − k ≥ max{π(N,TM ), π(N,Tm)},
or, equivalently,
k ≤ k̂(D,Φ) = min{θ(Φm − ΦM + αoDo), (1 − θ)(ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}.
Given (Do,Du), the consumer chooses (Φm,ΦM ) to maximize her expected surplus, subject to
the constraints that the expert will incur k if and only if k ≤ k̂(D,Φ) and that he receives
non-negative expected profit by agreeing to see the consumer.
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The expert is willing to accept (Φm,ΦM ) with the obligation to serve if:
Π(D,Φ) =
[
β + (1− β)F (k̂)
]
[θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM ]− (1− β)
∫ k̂
0
tdF (t)
+ (1− β)
[
1− F (k̂)
]
max{ΦM − θαoDo,Φm − (1− θ)αuDu} ≥ 0.
Define
D∗o =
k∗
θαo
, D∗u =
k∗
(1− θ)αu
; (17)
Φ∗M = (1− β)
[
k∗ −
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt
]
= Φ∗m. (18)
Notice that (D∗o ,D
∗
u) satisfy (11).
Proposition 4 Suppose that the expert is obligated to treat the consumer after seeing her. Then,
liability rule (17), under which the equilibrium prices satisfy (18), leads to full efficiency as
described in Lemma 1.
Proof. First, from the proof of part (ii) in Lemma 2, the equilibrium prices (Φ∗M , Φ
∗
m) satisfy
Φ∗M − θαoDo = Φ
∗
m − (1− θ)αuDu.
Thus, under (17), the expert will choose k efficiently:
k̂(D∗,Φ∗) = min{θ (Φ∗m − Φ
∗
M + αoD
∗
o) , (1− θ) (Φ
∗
M − Φ
∗
m + αuD
∗
u)}
= θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u) = k
∗.
Next, since
π(N,TM ) = Φ
∗
M − θαoD
∗
o = Φ
∗
m − (1− θ)αuD
∗
u = π(N,Tm),
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if k > k∗, the expert will choose (N,TM ) when zo ≤ z
∗
o and (N,Tm) when zo > z
∗
o . Moreover:
Π(D∗,Φ∗) = [β + (1− β)F (k∗)] {Φ∗M + θ [(1− θ)αuD
∗
u − θαoD
∗
o ]}
+ (1− β) [1− F (k∗)] (Φ∗M − θαoD
∗
o)− (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
tf(t)dt
= Φ∗M − θαoD
∗
o − (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
tf(t)dt+ [β + (1− β)F (k∗)] k∗
= Φ∗M − θαoD
∗
o + βk
∗ + (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt = 0
if Φ∗M and Φ
∗
m satisfy
Φ∗M = θαoD
∗
o − βk
∗ − (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt, Φ∗m = (1− θ)αuD
∗
u − βk
∗ − (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt,
which simplify to (18). Note that these prices are optimal for the consumer subject to Π(D,Φ) ≥
0, and (Φ∗M ,Φ
∗
m) indeed satisfy (6). They are thus equilibrium prices.
The obligation to serve restores efficiency by forcing the expert to provide a treatment upon
seeing the consumer even when he has no precise information about the consumer’s type. This
eliminates the inefficiency that arises when the prices are not high enough to motivate the
expert to treat the consumer if he does not learn t. Essentially, this requirement enables the
consumer to extract all information rents from the expert. In reality, the obligation to serve
may be imposed under certain situations, such as for emergency care. However, in other cases,
it may be difficult to enforce the obligation to serve. After an initial consultation, it would seem
reasonable that the expert, without taking any payment from the consumer, will have the right
not to provide treatment. A dentist, for example, may simply refer a patient to a “specialist”
after seeing her.
6. Conclusion
This paper has studied the design of efficient liability in a model of expert markets where proper
incentives are needed for the expert to exert diagnosis effort and to recommend the appropriate
treatment. We characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for a liability rule to implement
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full efficiency, and identify situations where the condition is satisfied. The efficient liability rule
imposes penalty on the expert that increases with the size of consumer loss associated with
verified overtreatment or undertreatment. The penalty may be punitive and is higher when the
probability of detecting “malpractice” is lower. We also show that while liability is necessary
to provide incentives to the expert, it creates a divergence between the social and private costs
of a loss to the consumer. Consequently, unfettered price competition between experts, while
maximizing consumer surplus, can render it impossible to achieve full efficiency. Under a second-
best liability rule, the expert generally under-invests in diagnosis effort. A (regulatory) constraint
on minimum prices or on obligation to serve enables an optimally-designed liability rule to restore
full efficiency.
We have analyzed a stylized model. There are other factors that can potentially impact the
performance of expert markets. For example, if there are repeat purchases, reputation concerns
can motivate experts to exert efforts and behave honestly in serving consumers. But reputation
may be fragile, and a well-designed liability rule can achieve efficiency even when reputation does
not. It is also possible that the expert and the consumer will rely on private contracts, instead
of legal liability, for damage payments in the case of a consumer loss; in such situations we may
interpret the optimal liability in our model as privately-stipulated damages. However, private
contracting for damage payments can have high transaction costs and contract enforcement may
still rely on the legal system. Moreover, if the damage payments through private contracting
are designed by the consumer or offered by (perfectly) competitive experts, they will generally
differ from the welfare-maximizing liability, because of the difference between social and private
costs from maltreatment.
The difficulties in providing proper incentives to experts (such as physicians and dentists) are
well known. The fact that malpractice liabilities are a prominent feature of markets such as those
for health care further suggests that legal liability plays important roles in expert markets.17
By showing how an efficient liability can be designed in a model of adverse selection and moral
hazard, this paper offers new insights on improving the performance of expert markets.
17In our model, the expert perfectly observes the consumer’s problem with diagnosis effort. Our main results
can still hold if we extend the model to a setting where the expert obtains only a noisy signal about the nature
of the consumer’s problem.
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6. Appendix
The appendix contains proofs for Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Proposition 2, and Corollary 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) If ΦM < θαoDo and Φm < (1− θ)αuDu, we have π(N,TM ) < 0 and π(N,Tm) < 0. Then,
condition (9) becomes π(ET ) ≥ 0, and hence k̂(D,Φ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM .
(ii) Suppose ΦM ≥ θαoDo. We have
θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM ≥ θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) .
Condition (9) then becomes
k ≤ min{θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}. (19)
Let
ΦM − Φm = ∆+ θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu. (20)
From (19), if the expert does not learn t upon seeing the consumer, he will choose to incur k if
and only if k does not exceed
k̂(D,Φ) = min {θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}
= min {θ [−∆+ (1− θ) (αoDo + αuDu)] , (1− θ) [∆ + θ (αoDo + αuDu)]}
=





θ [−∆+ (1− θ) (αoDo + αuDu)] if ∆ > 0
(1− θ) [∆ + θ (αoDo + αuDu)] if ∆ < 0
.
We show that
ΦM − Φm = θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu (21)
holds, or ∆ = 0, by demonstrating that the consumer can benefit from deviating to different
prices if ∆ 6= 0. When the expert does not learn t upon seeing the consumer, there are two cases
to consider:
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Case 1: ∆ > 0. It follows that
π(N,TM )− π(N,Tm) = ΦM − θαoDo − [Φm − (1− θ)αuDu] > 0.
Then π(N,TM ) > π(N,Tm) and the expert would choose TM if he is not initially informed
about t and also does not incur k.
On the other hand, consumer surpluses under the expert’s choice (N,TM ) and ET are re-
spectively:
S(N,TM ) = θ [−zo − ΦM − C + αoDo] + (1− θ) [0− ΦM − C] , (22)
S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM + C) . (23)
The consumer surplus is higher if Φm and ΦM are lower in each of the above cases. Note that
S (ET )− S(N,TM ) = θ [ΦM − Φm +C + zo − αoDo]
= θ [∆ + θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu + C + zo − αoDo]
= θ [∆ + C + zo − (1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo)] > 0.
Thus the consumer prefers ET to (N,TM ). By reducing ΦM slightly, ∆ becomes smaller and
k̂(D,Φ) will rise—so that the expert incurs k more often while (6) continues to hold—and the
consumer will also pay a lower expected price. Therefore this change increases the consumer’s
expected surplus. Thus, a pair of prices with ∆ > 0 is not optimal for the consumer.
Case 2: ∆ < 0. Then we have
π(N,Tm)− π(N,TM ) = Φm − (1− θ)αuDu − [ΦM − θαoDo] > 0.
The expert would choose Tm if he is not initially informed about t and also does not incur k.
The consumer surplus under the expert’s choice (N,Tm) is
S(N,Tm) = θ [−Φm] + (1− θ) [−zu + αuDu − Φm] , (24)
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and it follows that
S (ET )− S(N,Tm) = (1− θ) (Φm − ΦM − C + zu − αuDu)
= (1− θ) [−∆+ zu − C − θ (αuDu + αoDo)] > 0.
Using similar argument from Case 1 shows the consumer can increase her surplus by reducing
Φm.
Moreover, if the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, the reduction in ΦM or Φm always
increases consumer surplus given that (6) is satisfied. In this case, if ∆ 6= 0, consumer surplus
can be increased by reducing either ΦM or Φm. Thus (21) holds in equilibrium. Applying (21)
to (19), we obtain
k̂(D,Φ) = min {θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1 − θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}
= θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu).
Finally, if ΦM ≥ θαoDo is optimal for the consumer, then ΦM = θαoDo. If ΦM > θαoDo, the
consumer will pay a higher price if a major treatment is provided but k̂(D,Φ) is the same as
when ΦM = θαoDo. Thus ΦM = θαoDo leads to (weakly) higher surplus for the consumer than
a price with ΦM > θαoDo. Then, from (21) and ∆ = 0, Φm = (1− θ)αuDu.
Applying the same logic to the case Φm ≥ (1− θ)αuDu completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. For given (Do,Du), making use of (12), consumer surplus can be written
as the following function of Φ̄:
S
(
Φ̄
)
=





Sa(Φ̄) if Φ̄ = θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu)
Sb(Φ̄) if Φ̄ < θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu)
,
where
Sa(Φ̄) ≡
[
β + (1− β)F (k̂)
]
S (ET ) + (1− β)
[
1− F (k̂)
]
max{S (N,TM ) , S (N,Tm)},(25)
Sb(Φ̄) ≡
[
β + (1− β)F (k̂)
]
S (ET ) + (1− β)
[
1− F (k̂)
]
(−x) , (26)
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in which S(N,TM ), S(ET ) and S(N,Tm) are respectively given in (22), (23) and (24) and
k̂(D, Φ̄) =





θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu) if Φ̄ = θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu)
θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM if Φ̄ < θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu)
. (27)
For Sa(Φ̄) the consumer will always be served because ΦM = θαoDo and Φm = (1 − θ)αuDu,
whereas for Sb(Φ̄) the expert will choose R with probability (1− β)
[
1− F (k̂)
]
.
Note that S(Φ̄) is upper semi-continuous in Φ̄ on the support [0, θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu)],
being discontinuous only at Φ̄ = θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu). Therefore, there exists some Φ̄
∗ such
that
Φ̄∗ = Φ̄(D) = argmaxΦ̄∈[0,θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu)]S
(
Φ̄
)
. (28)
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We show that if x is sufficiently large, then there exists D∗
such that (13) holds and full efficiency is achieved. Given liability D, by choosing Φ̄ = θ(1 −
θ)(αoDo +αuDu), the consumer will always be served because in equilibrium ΦM = θαoDo and
Φm = (1− θ)αuDu. Note that S(ET ) ≥ S(N,TM ) by (11) and max{S(N,TM ), S(N,Tm)} =
−θzo − C. From (12) and (25), the consumer surplus satisfies
Sa(Φ̄) |Φ̄=θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu) ≥− (C + θzo) .
On the other hand, if the price satisfies Φ̄ < θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu), the expert will choose R
with probability (1− β)
[
1− F (k̂)
]
, and the consumer receives a surplus given by Sb(Φ̄) in (26).
Note that
k̂(D, Φ̄) ≤ k∗ = θ (C + zo) , S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM +C) ≤ −(1− θ)C.
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Thus
Sb(Φ̄) = βS (ET ) + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F (k̂) [S (ET )− (−x)]
≤ β [− (1− θ)C] + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F [θ (C + zo)] [− (1− θ)C − (−x)]
= −β (1− θ)C − (1− β)x [1− F (θ (C + zo))]− (1− β)F [θ (C + zo)] (1− θ)C.
It follows that, for any Sb(Φ̄),
Sa(Φ̄) |Φ̄=θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu) −S
b(Φ̄)
≥ − (C + θzo) + β (1− θ)C + (1− β)x [1− F (θ (C + zo))] + (1− β)F [θ (C + zo)] (1− θ)C
= − (C + θzo) + (1− θ)C [β + (1− β)F [θ (C + zo)]] + (1− β)x [1− F (θ (C + zo))] ≥ 0
⇐⇒ x ≥
(C + θzo)− (1− θ)C [β + (1− β)F (θ (C + zo))]
(1− β) [1− F (θ (C + zo))]
> 0.
Then, combined with part (i) of assumption (2), when
x ≥ max
{
C + θzo,
(C + θzo)− (1− θ)C [β + (1− β)F (θ (C + zo))]
(1− β) [1− F (θ (C + zo))]
}
≡ x̂,
Φ̄∗ = θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu). Moreover, D
∗
o =
(C+zo)
(1−θ)αo
and D∗u = 0 induce Φ̄
∗ = θ(1−θ)(αoDo+
αuDu), with Φ
∗
M =
θ(C+zo)
1−θ and Φ
∗
m = 0, as well as
k̂(D∗, Φ̄∗) = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗
o + αuD
∗
u) = θ (1− θ)αo
(C + zo)
(1− θ)αo
= θ (C + zo) = k
∗.
Both Conditions (11) and (6) are satisfied. Hence, the expert will choose Tt for t ∈ {m,M}
when he knows t (either initially or by incurring k), and will also incur k efficiently when he
does not know t initially. Therefore, when x > x̂, full efficiency is indeed implemented with D∗.
(ii) Recall that
Sb(Φ̄)|Φ̄<θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu) = βS (Et) + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F (k̂) [S (Et)− (−x)] ,
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where
S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM + C) = −Φ̄− (1− θ)C ≤ −(1− θ)C
and k̂(D, Φ̄) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM = Φ̄. Thus,
∂Sb(Φ̄)|Φ̄<θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu)
∂Φ̄
= −β + (1− β) f(k̂) [S (Et)− (−x)]− (1− β)F (k̂) < 0
if (1− β) f(k̂) [S (Et)− (−x)]− (1− β)F (k̂) < β, which holds if
β > arg max
k∈[0,k̄]
f (k) [x− (1− θ)C]−F (k)
1 + f (k) [x− (1− θ)C]−F (k)
≡ β′,
where β′ < 1.
Now suppose (Do,Du) satisfies θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu) = k
∗. Then, if β > β′, we have
∂Sb(Φ̄)|
Φ̄<k∗
∂Φ̄
< 0 and
max
Φ̄
Sb
(
Φ̄
)
∣
∣
∣
Φ̄<k∗
= Sb (0) = β [− (1− θ)C] + (1− β) (−x) ,
while
Sa(Φ̄) |Φ̄=k∗= − (C + θzo) ;
hence
max
Φ̄
Sb
(
Φ̄
)
∣
∣
∣
Φ̄<k∗
− Sa(Φ̄) |Φ̄=k∗
= −β [(1− θ)C]− (1− β)x+ (C + θzo) > 0
⇔β >
x− (C + θzo)
x− (1− θ)C
≡ β′′,
where β′′ < 1.
Therefore, if β > β̂ ≡ max
{
β′, β′′
}
, for liability rule D that satisfies θ(1−θ)(αoDo+αuDu) =
k∗, we have
max
Φ̄
Sb
(
Φ̄
)
∣
∣
∣
Φ̄<k∗
− Sa(Φ̄) |Φ̄=k∗> 0
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and the induced price is Φ̄∗ = 0, with ΦM = Φm = 0 and k̂(D, Φ̄
∗) = 0 < k∗. Furthermore, if
Do > 0, the expert will choose R even when treatment (N,TM ) is efficient. Making use of the
results in Proposition 1, we therefore conclude that, if β > β̂, there exists no D under which the
equilibrium is fully efficient.
Proof of Corollary 1. First, we show that a second-best liability D, if it exists, must induce
Φ̄(D) = θ(1− θ)(αoDo + αuDu) in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that D is a second-best
liability under which the consumer’s optimal price satisfies
Φ̄b(D) = arg supΦ̄∈[0,k∗)S
b(Φ̄) ≡ δ < k∗.
Then, Sb(δ) is attained, k̂(D, Φ̄) = δ, and
W (D) = Sb(δ) + (β + (1− β)F (δ))δ − (1− β)
∫ δ
0
kf(k)dk.
Consider another liability rule D̂ ≡ (D̂o, D̂u) satisfying θ(1 − θ)(αoD̂o + αuD̂u) = δ. Then,
under D̂ we have supΦ̄∈[0,δ) S
b(Φ̄(D̂)) ≤ Sb(δ) = supΦ̄∈[0,k∗) S
b(Φ̄b(D)), because δ < k∗ and
Sb
(
Φ̄
)
depends on D only through Φ̄. Under liability D̂, if the consumer chooses Φ̄ = δ =
θ(1 − θ)(αoD̂o + αuD̂u), with ΦM = θαoD̂o and Φm = (1 − θ)αuD̂u, then k̂(D̂, Φ̄) = δ and the
consumer obtains surplus
Sa(δ) = [β + (1− β)F (δ)] [−δ − (1− θ)C] + (1− β) [1− F (δ)]max{−C − θzo,−(1− θ)zu)}
> [β + (1− β)F (δ)] [−δ − (1− θ)C] + (1− β) [1− F (δ)] (−x) = Sb(δ).
Thus liability D̂ induces Φ̄(D̂) = δ and leads to welfare
W (D̂) = Sa(δ) + [β + (1− β)F (δ)] δ − (1− β)
∫ δ
0
kf(k)dk > W (D).
Therefore, any D that induces Φ̄b(D) can not be a second-best liability.
It follows that for a liability rule D∗∗ ≡ (D∗∗o ,D
∗∗
u ) to be a second-best, it must induce
expected price margin Φ̄(D∗∗) = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗∗
o + αuD
∗∗
u ) in equilibrium, with Φ
∗
M = θαoD
∗∗
o
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and Φ∗m = (1− θ)αuD
∗∗
u . Furthermore, k̂(D
∗∗, Φ̄) = Φ̄(D∗∗), and welfare is
W (k̂(D∗∗)) = (1− β)
[
1− F (k̂)
]
max{−θzo − C,−(1− θ)zu}
+
[
β + (1− β)F (k̂)
]
[−(1− θ)C]− (1− β)
∫ k̂
0
kf(k)dk.
Notice that
dW
dk̂
= (1− β)f(k̂) [−(1− θ)C] − (1− β)f(k̂)max{−θzo − C,−(1− θ)zu} − (1− β)k̂f(k̂)
= (1− β)f(k̂)
[
−(1− θ)C −max{−θzo − C,−(1 − θ)zu} − k̂
]
= (1− β)f(k̂)
(
k∗ − k̂
)
> 0 for k̂ < k∗.
Thus, for k̂ < k∗, welfare increases with k̂.
We next show that a second-best liability, D∗∗, indeed exists. Suppose a liability rule
D = (Do,Du) is such that Φ̄1 = θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu) = k
∗. Because the first-best is not at-
tainable, the equilibrium expected price margin Φ̄ (D) = θΦm (D) + (1− θ)ΦM (D) < Φ̄1 = k
∗,
where Φm (D) and ΦM (D) are equilibrium price margins given D, and we have S
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
=
Sb
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
> Sa
(
Φ̄1
)
.
Because Sa
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
> Sb
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
for given Φ̄ (D) , we have Sa
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
> Sb
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
>
Sa
(
Φ̄1
)
. Thus, since Sa
(
Φ̄
)
is continuous on
[
Φ̄ (D) , Φ̄1
]
, there exists a number Φ̄2 ∈
(
Φ̄ (D) , Φ̄1
)
such that Sa
(
Φ̄2
)
= Sb
(
Φ̄ (D)
)
. Therefore, the optimal liability, when the first-best fails to ex-
ist, is D∗∗ = (D∗∗o ,D
∗∗
u ) that induces the highest equilibrium Φ̄ = θ(1 − θ)(αoDo + αuDu) on
Φ̄ ∈
[
0, Φ̄2
]
. That is, D∗∗ = (D∗∗o ,D
∗∗
u ) satisfies
Φ̄ (D∗∗) = θ(1− θ)(αoD
∗∗
o + αuD
∗∗
u ) = Φ̄2
with equilibrium price margins Φ∗M = θαoD
∗∗
o and Φ
∗
m = (1−θ)αuD
∗∗
u , the consumer’s surplus is
S
(
Φ̄
)
= Sa
(
Φ̄ (D∗∗)
)
, the expected price margin is Φ̄ (D∗∗) , and k̂(D∗∗, Φ̄ (D∗∗)) = Φ̄ (D∗∗) <
k∗.
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